Bangu’s random thoughts on Bertrand’s Paradox by Rowbottom, Darrell P. & Shackel, Nicholas
Friedman. And minimality echoes the spirit of causal models of explanation,
where such models are used to rule out derivations involving irrelevant fac-
tors (such as the hexed salt example) that are deemed explanatory by the
deductive-nomological model.
As I mentioned at the outset, my aim has not been to attack Lange’s gen-
eral thesis that proofs by mathematical induction are not explanatory,
but rather to undercut the argument that Lange provides for this thesis.
To defend the contrary claim that certain inductive proofs are explanatory
would require providing a worked-out theory of mathematical explanation,
something that I have not tried to do here. What I have tried to do is to show
that there are plausible ways of thinking about mathematical explanation
which are in tension with key steps in Lange’s argument, and to this extent
his premises are more ‘controversial’ than he admits.4
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Bangu’s random thoughts on Bertrand’s paradox
DARRELL P. ROWBOTTOM AND NICHOLAS SHACKEL
Bangu (2010) claims that Bertrand’s paradox rests on a hitherto unrecog-
nized assumption, which assumption is sufficiently dubious to throw the
4 A version of this paper was delivered to the Work in Progress Seminar, Department of
Philosophy, University of Oxford, in July 2009 and benefited from useful feedback from
audience members. Thanks also to Marc Lange and Arlyss Gease for helpful comments on
earlier drafts.
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burden of proof back onto ‘objectors to [the principle of indifference]’ (2010:
31). We show that Bangu’s objection to the assumption is ill-founded and
that the assumption is provably true.
Bangu discerns a ‘common structure’ in some of Bertrand’s paradoxes:
One begins with a variable x . . . and then one considers a scaling trans-
formation  such that x0¼(x). (Bangu 2010: 31)
Speaking in these terms on Bertrand’s behalf, we construe his objection to
the principle of indifference thus:
(1) At least when  is a nice function,1 the probability of choosing at
random in the interval [c, b]	 [a, b] should be the same as when
choosing at random in the interval [(c), (b)]	 [(a), (b)].
(2) Yet applying the principle of indifference results in uniform probability
distributions on [a, b] and [(a), (b)], when the probability that
x2[c, b] is not necessarily equal to the probability that x02 [(c), (b)].
(3) Contradiction; therefore reject the principle of indifference.
The second premiss might be rejected: we might have an empirical situation
in which the transformed variable is a causally dependent variable, in which
case there is no reason to suppose the probability distribution of the
dependent variable is uniform. However, the principle of indifference is
supposed to be an unrestricted principle, so Bertrand’s argument cannot be
generally defeated by this point.
Bangu rejects the first premiss on the ground that it rests on a false, or
at least undefended, assumption:
R: If the argument of a scaling function is random in an interval, then
the scaled value is random as well (in the scaled interval). (2010: 33)2
Bangu takes unpredictability ‘to be the standard conception of random-
ness’ and argues against R on the basis of the following scenario:
Suppose a machine, a random number generator, picks a value x
in the interval [a, b]. Randomness here is understood in the predictive
sense: there is no way to predict what value this choice will return.
The machine records it, but does not communicate it to us. We now
ask whether the transformed value is also random in the interval [a0, b0]
[¼[(a), (b)]], in the same predictive sense. One might say that this is
not so, as there is a crucial difference between the value of x and the
1 By a nice function, we mean a deterministic continuous bijection that maps intervals
neatly: ([x, y])¼ [(x), (y)]. This rules out  being either a random function or a chaotic
function.
2 The analysis of Bertand’s chord length paradox in Shackel 2007, see especially pages 159–
61, shows that Bangu’s common structure does not underlie that paradox and hence that
Bangu’s criticism of this assumption is irrelevant to that paradox.
690 | darrell rowbottom and nicholas shackel
 at R
adcliffe Science Library, Bodleian Library on O
ctober 31, 2010
a
n
alysis.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
transformed value. While we cannot predict the value of x, we can
predict the value of the transformed: we find what value has been
recorded, and we scale it. So, is the transformed value random in
[a0, b0] after all? Or, is the sense of ‘prediction’ not sufficiently well
defined to be useful here? (2010: 33)
Bangu’s argument here rests on a premiss that is patently false. In a perfectly
straightforward sense, namely prior to the machine selecting, the transformed
value is no more predictable than the original. What he calls the transformed
value being predictable is the situation of being given the value the machine
picked and using that to predict, say, the square by squaring it. But, of course,
in that sense of ‘predictable’ the value the machine picked is precisely as pre-
dictable! Take the value the machine picked as the prediction of the value the
machine picked.
Allow us to spell this out more slowly. Accept that randomness should be
understood in terms of unpredictability. When we consider the truth of R,
what is at issue is whether if x is not predictable, (x) is not predictable.
Bangu’s argument seems directed, instead, at whether if x is not predictable
but we know x,3 (x) is not predictable. Now clearly, if  is what we called a
nice function, the unpredictability of x will not carry over to (x) once we
know x. But that is irrelevant.
The truth of R can be illustrated by an elementary example. Let X be the
variable that takes its values from the roll of a fair die. Let (X) be the
variable that is zero in the event that X is not 1, and one in the event that
X is 1.4  is known. Even though the image of  is smaller than its domain,
(X) is no more predictable than X. In order to see this, consider a sequence
of values of X from such a die roll and the corresponding values of (X):
SX 1,2,1,1,5,3,3,1,4,1,6,4,2, . . . xn . . .
S 1,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0, . . . (xn) . . .
If either of these sequences is predictable then knowing some number of the
previous members of the sequence suffices for knowing the next one. Suppose
that SX is unpredictable. That means that for all n, knowing hx1, . . . , xni does
not suffice for knowing xnþ1. Now we consider the predictability of S. We
can suppose that we know hx1, . . . , xni and we know h(x1), . . . , (xn)i, and
3 This is, presumably, the import of ‘we find what value has been recorded’ in the above
quotation from Bangu.
4 Note that except for the specified dependence on a die roll this could be a finite example of
Bertrand’s paradox. Since X¼ 1 iff (X)¼1, absent an empirical base the principle of
indifference gives P(X¼1)¼ 1/6 and P((X)¼1)¼ 1/2. We believe that Keynes’s way
around this kind of example, namely appeal to indivisibility, has been too easily accepted.
However, this is not the place to discuss this issue further; see Shackel and Rowbottom,
Manuscript. The point here is just to have a finite case that is fully analogous to standard
paradoxical cases.
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because SX is unpredictable we do not know xnþ1. So for all we know xnþ1
could be 1 or 6 and so (xnþ1) could be 1 or 0 and hence we do not know
(xnþ1). So knowing h(x1), . . . ,(xn)i does not suffice for knowing (xnþ1)
and S is unpredictable. Hence if X is unpredictable, (X) is unpredictable,
whence if X is random, (X) is random.
In short, knowledge of how to map SX onto S does not render S any
more predictable than SX, and that is all that is required for the truth of R in
this example. This argument is in fact general. It neither depends on the
discreteness of the event spaces nor on . It applies to a wide range of
functions. Its conclusion is equivalent to the assumption that Bangu rejects.5
Now one might instead consider ‘special cases’ where  is a constant func-
tion on the random variable X.6 Then it is true that (X) is predictable
(given the knowledge that  is a constant function). However, this kind
of special case does not matter for Bertrand’s paradox. Bertrand needs
only one non-constant function to result in inconsistent probabilities: to
refute him requires no such functions to exist. We suggest this is precisely
why Bertrand and commentators on his paradox – among them, exceptional
philosophers such as Keynes (1921/1963) and van Fraassen (1989) – have
not mentioned the assumption that Bangu raises. The assumption is obvious-
ly true and for that reason not mentioned.
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